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Introduction 
This policy brief analyses the state of EU–Russian 
relations as seen from the vantage point of the 
summit held on June 9-10 in Nizhny Novgorod. 
We describe the political context in which the 
summit was embedded, the anticipations it 
evoked from the both sides, its outcomes and 
some perspectives for the nearest future. 
The EU–Russia summits have for quite a number 
of years become the object of mockery byRussian 
experts and journalists, most of whom had reason 
to deem that the regular meetings of Russian and 
EU leaders had turned into largely futile 
diplomatic ceremonies deprived of any 
meaningful content. It was predictable that the 
most recent EU–Russia summit convened in 
Nizhny Novgorod a few days ago would not be 
able to reverse this unfortunate state of affairs. It 
did not brought a breakthrough in Brussels-
Moscow bilateral relations. The summit has been 
mainly reduced to a general discussion on the 
future of the EU-Russia relations and world 
affairs (with some mostly rhetorical emphasis on 
the implications of the global crisis and most 
acute local conflicts). No significant progress was 
reported on the most important issues for both 
sides such as introduction of a visa-free regime, 
partnership for modernisation, Russia’s accession 
to the WTO, the new EU-Russia strategic 
partnership agreement, energy dialogue, new 
agreement on climate change, etc. 
On the eve of the summit: Political 
context 
On the very opening day of the summit, the 
European Parliament passed the resolution that, 
on the one hand, explained the EU position on the 
current state of affairs in EU-Russian relations 
and, on the other hand, listed areas of contention 
between Brussels and Moscow.1 In a certain 
sense, the Parliament and Commission played a 
famous ‘good cop’ – ‘bad cop’ game. In case of 
necessity the Commission could refer to the 
parliamentary resolution (that, in fact, set 
limitations on the powers of the EU delegation), 
to explain to Russians why Brussels was not 
ready for the further progress in the bilateral 
relations. 
Five examples are most illustrative of the depth of 
pre-existing disconnections between Moscow and 
Brussels. One issue is trans-border cooperation, 
which is a pivotal issue in view of the visa 
facilitation arrangements that Russia has 
desperately tried to achieve for years. Yet on the 
eve of the Nizhny Novgorod summit Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin had quite unexpectedly 
declared that Russia is not interested in allowing 
a special visa regime for one single region – the 
Kaliningrad oblast. He tried unconvincingly to 
justify his remark by speculating that should 
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Russia give its consent to a visa-free regime for 
residents of this Russian enclave, the EU would 
block further negotiations with Russia on 
abolishing visas.2 This enunciation, almost 
literally reproducing the Russian old – and not 
particularly fruitful – position taken in the 1990s, 
was, in fact, later disavowed by both President 
Medvedev3 and Russian Ambassador to the EU 
Vladimir Chizhov. Both officials confirmed that 
Russia is ready not only to implement the almost 
finalised agreements with Poland on visa-free 
regime within the 30-kilometer area from both 
sides of the border, but also wishes to extend this 
practice to the entire Kaliningrad region.4  
The practical implementation of Russia’s 
experiment with 72-hour visa-free travel to the 
Kaliningrad oblast for EU citizens gave another 
indication of inconsistency of the Russian stand. 
Right on the eve of the EU–Russia summit the 
first group of German tourists took advantage of 
this Russian proposal and visited Kaliningrad, yet 
Russian border-guard authorities banned them 
from meeting with journalists and thus from 
giving the much-needed publicity to this small 
step in the right direction.5 This intentional lack of 
due openness looks illogical and reveals deep 
imbalances and disconnections within Russian 
foreign policy machinery. 
A second issue where conceptual disagreements 
between Moscow and Brussels are meaningful is 
the rule of law. The EU has repeatedly expressed 
its strong and persistent interest in the cases of 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Sergey Magnitsky 
(the lawyer who worked for European companies 
and was found dead in jail), and called for full-
fledged and politically unbiased investigations of 
each of them. But right on the eve of the summit 
Russian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov 
speculatived that “punishing Russian officials 
implicated in these affairs is not a good method. 
It can only irritate the relations with EU”.6 This 
logic does not seem to have any prospect of 
acceptance in Europe and only reveals the still-
unbridgeable gaps between Russian and 
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European understandings of the rule of law 
mechanisms.  
A third set of issues where the search for common 
language has not so far yielded any fruit is 
democracy and civil society. Russia has agreed to an 
EU-Russia Civil Society Forum to include a 
number of prominent Russian human rights 
activists. Yet on the eve of the Nizhny Novgorod 
summit, several of them were informally 
pressured by law enforcement organs and 
received verbal warnings to abstain from any 
public activity during the summit.7 Again, this 
unfortunate way of controlling the civil society 
groups by Russian authorities unveils the 
conceptual distance and asymmetry between 
Russia and the European Union in terms of their 
approaches to civil society development.  
A fourth controversial issue is energy. The main 
obstacle to Russia’s ratification of the European 
Energy Charter is Moscow’s unwillingness to 
separate production, reprocessing and 
transportation of gas from each other. In practice, 
the Charter’s requirements mean reorganisation 
of monopolist companies such as Gazprom and 
better access by foreign companies to the Russian 
energy sector. Besides, Russia, as presidential 
foreign policy adviser Sergey Prikhodko made it 
clear right on the eve of the Nizhny Novgorod 
summit, is eager to further develop atomic energy 
technologies and has expressed its sharp interest 
in participating in developing the atomic projects 
in Europe.8 This intention, however, runs against 
the dominant anti-nuclear attitudes that are 
especially vibrant in countries like Germany and 
Italy, which are among the key Russian partners 
in Europe.  
A fifth issue that fuelled mutual irritation was 
different approaches to food security. Russia’s ban 
on the export of vegetables from the EU as a 
reaction to E-coli epidemics was met with 
dissatisfaction by Brussels. Despite the fact that 
Russia pledged to lift its embargo, it is still in 
place at the moment of writing this memo. 
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Results: The pessimists were right 
The results of the Nizhny Novgorod summit 
were a sort of a ‘cold shower’ for optimists who 
were strongly encouraged by the progress that 
was made at the Brussels summit of 7 December 
2010. The optimists believed that the two sides 
could be able to quickly reach a series of 
agreements on the above-mentioned issues, but 
the Nizhny Novgorod summit did not prove their 
expectations. 
The summit confirmed the lack of progress in the 
following problematic areas of EU-Russia 
relations: 
•  Visa-free regime. Despite the fact that the EU 
and Russian experts prepared the list of common 
steps (roadmap) for visa-free travel between 
Russia and the EU in May 2011, no such 
agreement was concluded at the Nizhny 
Novgorod summit. The same story unfolded with 
the draft of an agreement on a facilitated visa 
regime for the residents of border regions of the 
Kaliningrad Oblast, Poland and Lithuania. To 
explain delays, the European side refers to 
residual technical problems related to the 
implementation process. For example, the EU 
notes that it is difficult for Russia to quickly 
provide its citizens with new-generation 
biometrical passports. Brussels also underlines 
that its dialogue with Russia should be in tune 
with the visa facilitation process concerning 
Eastern Partnership countries (this is both 
incomprehensible and irritating for Moscow). The 
EU also insists that Russia must cease issuing 
passports to residents of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, which are seen by the EU as occupied 
provinces of Georgia. It also emphasises the 
necessity to intensify cooperation on illegal 
immigration, improved controls at cross-border 
checkpoints and information exchange on 
terrorism and organised crime. Contrary to the 
Russian expectations, Brussels considers the 
introduction of the visa-free regime with Russia 
as a long-term rather than a short-term prospect. 
•  Russia’s accession to the WTO. Despite the 
EU’s general support for Russia’s WTO accession, 
Brussels continues pressing Moscow on a number 
of specific issues. For example, the EU urges 
Russia to adopt a stable and fair legal framework 
to properly regulate business activity. It also 
insists on renunciation of any protectionist 
measures, such as the Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus 
customs union, which has led to higher 
consolidated tariffs. The EU is particularly 
worried about the alleged Russian pressure on 
Ukraine to join this customs union. Brussels is 
discontent with Russian state support for Russian 
and foreign automobile companies which 
assemble cars from imported spare parts as well 
with the misuse of sanitary sanctions (including 
the current ban on all imports of EU vegetables). 
The EU is of a little help to Russia in dealing with 
the Cairnes group (19 agricultural exporting 
countries) and Georgia, which – for various 
reasons – oppose Russia’s WTO accession. 
•  Partnership for modernisation (PfM). The PfM 
programme that was initiated by the EU-Russia 
Rostov-on-Don summit (1 June 2010) has also 
evoked some tensions between Brussels and 
Moscow. While Russia mostly insisted on 
European investment and high-tech transfers 
under this programme, the EU side tried to 
develop a more general vision of modernisation 
(including its legal and socio-political aspects). 
The EU insisted on the importance of ensuring an 
effective, independent functioning of the 
judiciary and stepping up the fight against 
corruption (including the signing by Russia of the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials). Brussels also believes 
that an active involvement of civil society 
institutions in the reformist process should be a 
part of the modernisation ‘package’.9 
•  Human rights, democracy. The EU repeatedly 
emphasised the urgent need for Russia to 
implement fundamental principles of democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and media freedom 
as a basis for cooperation. In this context, Brussels 
calls on Russia to take concrete action to protect 
journalists, human rights activists, minorities and 
opposition representatives from violence and 
intimidation. The cases of Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
and his business associate Platon Lebedev, Sergey 
Magnitsky, the ban on a gay pride march in 
Moscow for the sixth consecutive year, etc., are 
regularly mentioned in the EU-Russian 
discussions on civil society issues. The European 
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Parliament calls on both Brussels and Moscow to 
set up an EU-Russia civil society dialogue in 
connection with the biennial EU-Russia summits 
and suggests the inclusion of the EU-Russia Civil 
Society Forum in the framework of the PfM 
programme. 
The EU is also concerned with the forthcoming 
State Duma elections and considers it important 
that these elections should be free and fair and 
based on the implementation of election 
standards set by the Council of Europe and 
OSCE. Brussels urges the Russian authorities to 
allow OSCE/Council of Europe long-term 
election observation at the earliest stage. Moscow 
sees these EU demands as an interference in its 
domestic affairs. 
•  Local conflict resolution i s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
priority of the EU-Russian cooperation in the 
framework of the Common Space on External 
Security. However, there is an obvious lack of 
progress in this area. For example, Brussels insists 
that Russia must fulfil all of the conditions under 
the Six-point Ceasefire Agreement (2008) and to 
immediately withdraw its troops from the 
occupied (according to the EU terminology) 
Georgian territories of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia to the pre-conflict positions. Moscow 
also must guarantee the EU Monitoring Mission 
access to those territories. The EU also is 
discontent with the Russian position on 
Transnistria, particularly with the lack of 
progress on the negotiations about the conflict 
there and calls for a resumption of the official 5+2 
negotiations with the aim of finding a solution in 
the very near future. 
Yet the most discouraging outcome of the summit 
is not only the much discussed lack of signed 
agreements, but something even more 
fundamentally frustrating:  the lack of progress in 
overcoming the deep perceptional and normative 
dissonances between the two parties. A long 
tradition of infusing different meanings in the 
words that they use for speaking to each other 
proved to remain the key factor shaping bilateral 
relations.  
Trends to come 
The perspectives of the EU–Russian relations 
have to be discussed within the context of two 
highly consequential processes developing within 
the European Union. The first is the rise of a more 
unilateralist Germany that not only increasingly 
expresses its growing criticism of the way in 
which EU integration is proceeding, but also 
appears more eager to cooperate more closely 
with countries like Russia and China. Russia 
obviously did not fail to notice the German 
abstention from supporting the NATO-led 
military operation in Libya, which can be 
interpreted as one more indication of similarity of 
interests of Berlin and Moscow in world affairs. 
Therefore, one may anticipate the growing 
importance of Russian–German relations, as 
opposed to a wider Russian–EU policy 
framework. 
The second trend within Europe, which can 
hypothetically be quite beneficial to Russia, is 
Europe’s continuing regionalisation. A number of 
instances can be cited, including the still existing 
Visegrad Group, the French Union for 
Mediterranean project (whose prospects were 
unquestionably challenged by the most recent 
developments in North Africa and the Middle 
East), the January 2011 Nordic Baltic Summit 
meeting in the UK, etc. It is likely that the 
forthcoming Polish EU Presidency will add a new 
momentum to the Eastern dimension of the EU. A 
‘Europe of regions’ which can be seen as a 
conceptual counter-balance – if not an alternative 
– to the centralised ‘fortress Europe’ model does 
certainly contain some advantages that Russia 
may try to explore in strategically thinking about 
its future relations with Europe. In the meantime 
this is not more than an opportunity, since there 
is of course no guarantee that Russia may better 
fit into ever-emerging new political spaces in 
Europe, to include a ‘Baltic–Nordic Europe’, a 
‘Black Sea Europe’, and so forth.  
It is within this context that the forthcoming 
Polish Presidency in the EU has to be placed. It is 
almost certain that Warsaw will try to make a 
stronger accent on the Eastern Partnership 
project, which hypothetically can be used for 
making at least some steps towards a long-
awaited progress in the conflicts in Transdniestia 
and Nagorno-Karabakh. The measure of the 
Kremlin’s willingness to take the Polish half-a-
year Presidency as a opportunity rather than as a 
potential threat will become a crucial test for the 
efforts to turn the Russian–Polish relations onto a 
more constructive course.  